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Abstract
How does the human animal who thinks and loves relate to criminal justice? This 
essay takes up the idea of a moral psychology of guilt promoted by Bernard Wil-
liams and Herbert Morris. Against modern liberal society’s ‘peculiar’ legal morality 
of voluntary responsibility (Williams), it pursues Morris’s ethical account of guilt 
as involving atonement and identification with others. Thinking of guilt in line with 
Morris, and linking it with the idea of moral psychology, takes the essay to Freud’s 
metapsychology in Civilization and Its Discontents. Two conflicting routes to guilt 
are noted in Freud, one involving internalisation of external anger to suppress 
destructive instincts, the other loving identification with others in the process of self-
formation. This second route is developed through the psychoanalytic thought of 
Hans Loewald and Jonathan Lear. Following Loewald, the moral psychology of self-
formation makes loving identification with others the root of responsibility, guilt and 
atonement. Following Lear, the moral psychology of guilt developed on these lines 
renders psychoanalysis part of a broadly understood philosophical project follow-
ing Aristotelian and Socratic principles. Underlying Morris’s account of guilt is the 
possibility of ‘prospective identification’, understood as the moral and psychological 
ground of guilt and reconciliation. This is the rational core of criminal justice, which 
maintains an uneasy relationship with law’s ‘peculiar’ morality.
Keywords Criminal justice · Guilt · Moral psychology · Identification · Love · Freud
Nothing of him that doth fade,
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.
Shakespeare, The Tempest
In the introduction to a recent set of essays, Jeffrie Murphy notes he started to question 
his commitment to retributive philosophy in the light of the thought, amongst others, of 
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Freud (Murphy 2012, xii). Murphy follows in the footsteps of others disenchanted with 
philosophical debate around punishment. His essay on the ethical concerns animating 
guilt and shame pursues a critical line that takes in the work of earlier objectors like 
Bernard Williams and Herbert Morris, behind whom there also lurks Freud’s metapsy-
chology (Murphy 2012, ch. 5). But how exactly does psychoanalytic thinking relate to 
the philosophy of punishment, and what exactly does it say about issues of guilt, blame 
and responsibility? This essay considers both of these questions. As regards the first, it 
considers the relationship between metapsychology and philosophy, arguing that these 
should be seen as two parts of one larger, philosophical, endeavour. As for the second, 
it argues for a different direction in Freud’s theory, and how it regards issues of guilt 
and responsibility, than the standard approach.
My focus is Freud’s understanding of guilt in his book, Civilization and Its Discon-
tents, where the obvious reading is not the most helpful, but where a different reading 
can be developed to illuminate the moral concerns of thinkers like Murphy, Williams 
and Morris. The problem with the obvious reading is briefly identified by Murphy. 
We may agree ‘that the development of a moral sense or conscience (a super-ego)… 
involves the internalization of parental commands perceived as authoritative’ (Murphy 
2012, 96), but then we should note that a causal reading of guilt cannot account for the 
moral person thinking critically, for example, by challenging parental or other author-
ity figures. This is a fair criticism of Freud’s account as it is normally, and reasonably, 
taken on the face of his text. But there is a way of constructing the metapsychology of 
guilt that is completely in line with Freud, yet pursues a more promising strand in a 
complex and conflicted oeuvre. Guilt can be seen as based on responsibility and a wish 
to atone for wrongdoing that is not derived from internalised fear of external authority 
figures. Rather, it comes from the way humans develop as rational, autonomous, loving 
beings in relation with each other, as animals who think and love.
Developing this argument, I revisit Morris’s idea of a moral psychology of guilt 
alongside Williams’s critique of liberal morality. Williams, also arguing for a moral 
psychology, represented an important bridgehead to a better understanding of the 
relation between legal responsibility and moral guilt, while Morris developed a sub-
stantive way forward. The argument I will make concerns an account of identifica-
tion, which is crucial both to psychoanalysis and understanding moral guilt. It is 
the explicit key to one of Morris’s arguments, and I will develop it in the direc-
tion of Freud in a specific way, following the path-breaking work of Jonathan Lear 
and his psychoanalytic mentor, Hans Loewald. This provides the basis for a more 
sophisticated ethical account in line with Morris’s and Williams’s concerns. It also, 
in Lear’s work, reveals the internal connections between metapsychology and phi-
losophy, promoting a synthetic understanding of philosophy along Aristotelian lines 
that includes metapsychology.
1  Two Critiques of Modern Guilt
A truthful ethical life is, and always has been, one that can include our best 
understanding of our psychological life, and we know that such an understand-
ing is compatible with naturalistic explanation (Williams 1995, 19–20).
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In this section, I outline what I call Williams’s bridgehead for two critiques of the 
modern idea of guilt. I start with his account of modern moral philosophy as a 
‘peculiar’ institution, before identifying the political and ethical critiques of modern 
morality as it affects the understanding of guilt as a question of voluntary action.
1.1  Engaging the ‘Peculiar’ Institution
The bridgehead that I find in Williams takes critique in two directions, both of which 
are linked to the nature of modern morality, which he described as a ‘peculiar’ insti-
tution (Williams 2011, ch. 10). What I wish to bring out is the way that his account 
of morality links with his understanding of law, and how its limits, its peculiarities, 
reflect its connection to legal institutions. These limits at the same time point to ethi-
cal possibilities that lie beyond morality in its ‘peculiar’ form, possibilities that he 
summed up by invoking the idea, like Morris, of a naturalistic moral psychology 
(Morris 1976). This should reflect more broadly and more truly on the nature of 
moral experience than does what we might call ‘actually existing morality’, morality 
in its ‘peculiar’ form, as endorsed in modern liberal political and legal thought.
One focus of Williams’s argument was concepts of blame, guilt and responsi-
bility, all of which reflected aspects of morality’s ‘peculiar’ modern form, and the 
critical bridgehead goes in two ways. The first is to the political critique of the mod-
ern moral understanding of these terms. Blame, guilt and responsibility are moral 
terms that are systematically limited and impoverished by their connection to mod-
ern institutional forms of a political and legal nature, linked to the liberal state. The 
second is an ethical critique going to the deeper moral psychology of these same 
terms, which Williams glimpsed, but did not himself really pursue. Important here 
was his emphasis on going to theorists of morality beyond the mainstream, but who 
he thought, precisely because they were beyond the mainstream, had something dif-
ferent to offer. Amongst those that Williams noted as providing a better account of 
morality was Freud, though he did not elaborate.1
Pursuing this second critique here, I take up Morris’s account of guilt, which pro-
vides a deeper, substantive, account of guilt, one that wrestles with how Williams’s 
‘peculiar’ institution sees it, and finds a way beyond it. Morris had read Freud and 
was wont to discuss him. Though he does not credit his account of identification to 
reading Freud, there is a clear connection in how he expresses it. Developing Mor-
ris’s concept of identification in a way that makes the link clear, via Lear’s philo-
sophical understanding of Freud, gives us a fresh development of the moral gram-
mar of blame and guilt utilised in modern morality’s actually existing form.2 I begin 
with the first, political, critique, which situates the problem that the second, ethical, 
critique—the main focus of this essay—then engages.
1 On the significance of Williams’s opening of philosophy both to a limited Nietzschean critique and to 
psychoanalysis, see Lear (2003, 2004).
2 Of comparative interest here is another, metaphysical, critique of modern morality based on an ethics 
of love offered by the young Hegel, before he himself succumbed to the modern form in his mature work: 
see Norrie (2018a).
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1.2  A Political Critique: Against Conflation
Writing of modern morality as a ‘peculiar’ institution in Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy (2011), Williams noted that it served the function of rendering modern 
society workable. Focusing on the nature of obligation, he noted that it secured reli-
ability in social matters, for people could reasonably expect others to behave in cer-
tain ways. However, it bought social functionality at a price. Williams saw blame as 
central to crime and punishment, but as involving the fiction that people were free to 
act otherwise than they did. Agents were treated as though relevant ethical consid-
erations established by state and law were reasons on which they acted. The system 
had the function of continuously recruiting citizens into the fiction of a universal, 
deliberative community, and this was an achievement of the morality system. He 
questioned, however, whether—since it was a fiction—the system could survive a 
clear understanding of how it worked.
In its place, Williams offered an ethical approach that could more openly and 
honestly reflect the true nature of human ethical being. What he argued for was
a reflective and nonmythical understanding of our ethical practices. It is cer-
tain that the practices of blame, and more generally the style of people’s nega-
tive ethical reactions to others, will change. The morality system, in my view, 
can no longer help them to do so in a desirable way (Williams 2011, 215).
Williams added that the key, and problematic, concept was that of ‘the voluntary’. 
Linking a person’s acts unproblematically to her character, he argued that the sys-
tem’s focus did not ask about the freedom to have chosen another character, so that 
the blame system narrowly focused on the conditions of the particular act. It was 
only able to do this because it did not operate alone, being linked to other practices 
of encouragement and discouragement to keep to the law, but this additional insti-
tutional support for moral concepts of the voluntary was ignored within the moral 
system itself. There is a ‘pressure within [the system] to require a voluntariness that 
will be total and will cut through character and psychological or social determina-
tion’, allocating blame on no more or less than what is claimed to be ‘the ultimately 
fair basis of the agent’s own contribution’ (Williams 2011, 216). Williams does not 
see this as ultimately fair at all, for it ignores the moral information that would oth-
erwise ground an ethics that could address how and why people act, and how they 
might be morally persuaded to behave in ways non-violative of others. Most know 
that blaming and punishing people as voluntary actors is ineffectual in controlling 
crime, but we are stuck with the morality system and blame because we can see no 
alternative. If we did away with it, we would be left with forms of persuasion indis-
tinguishable in spirit ‘from force and constraint’ (ibid). We remain therefore with 
the devil we know.
In the following passage from Shame and Necessity (1993), Williams speaks of 
overemphasis on ‘the voluntary’. This results from the modern conflation of a par-
ticular view of morality and a particular institutional setting, that of the liberal state. 
The outcome is an impoverished moral theory for morality has been conflated with 
politics:
1 3
Criminal Law and Philosophy 
We have handed many of the responses to a very special formation, the mod-
ern state, and we have principles governing what such a state can and should 
do. An important ideal that helps shape those principles is that an individual 
should, so far as possible, have control over his or her life, in relation to the 
power of the state…. To the extent that our ideas about legal responsibility are 
shaped by that ideal, they are governed by a certain political theory of free-
dom in the modern state, not by a moral refinement of the very conception 
of responsibility…. We deceive ourselves if we suppose that public practices 
of ascribing responsibility can be derived from an antecedent notion of moral 
responsibility, or that the idea of the voluntary is uniquely important to respon-
sibility (Williams 1993, 66–67).
This is Williams’s political critique of modern guilt. The weakness of modern ortho-
dox liberal theory resides not just in its intrinsic limitations, but in the fact that its 
concepts conflate a political aim and setting and a philosophical elaboration. It is 
because of the unwarranted fusion of morality, law and politics that we can say that 
one of Williams’s targets is the historical and political critique of modern moral and 
legal forms. From this position, the move is to a critical understanding of the nature 
of modern liberalism and how it shapes the social order for good and ill.3 The sec-
ond target in light of these limitations is to sketch an ethical alternative in the form 
of a critique of what he calls moralised psychology.
1.3  An Ethical Critique: Against Moralisation
Here, Williams pointed out a different direction to modern morality without tak-
ing things very far. He spoke about the need to develop a ‘naturalistic account 
of morality’, a term that, he conceded, was not ‘at all perspicuous’ (Altham and 
Harrison 1995, 203). What he meant was the difference between a moralised and 
a moral psychology. In the former, a given moral theory dominated and shaped 
ab initio the understanding of human psychology. It gave psychology the concepts 
to work with, so that the resulting account aped the philosophy it was supposed 
to develop. Modern morality’s emphasis on the voluntary control of action would 
be a case in point: it appears to represent the basis for an understanding of human 
moral psychology, but in reality it imposes a particular political and moral theory 
on psychology, so that it is moralised rather than moral. A non-moralised psy-
chology would relate itself to the open questioning of how humans act, and how 
their moral categories emerge from behaviours and settings, broadly conceived:
3 This is in essence the direction already taken by critical legal theory in relation to criminal law. The 
result is a political and historical critique of the structure, function and form of the law. See, e.g., Norrie 
(2000, 2014), Ramsay (2009), Lacey (2016), Farmer (2016) and Carvalho (2017). For discussion of the 
one-sided nature of this critique, since it omits the ethical direction developed below, see Norrie (2017b). 
As stated, the present essay focuses on the ethical critique and does not pursue the road already taken of 
political and historical critique.
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A non-moralised, or less moralised, psychology uses the categories of 
meaning, reasons, and value, but leaves it open, or even problematical, 
in what way moral reasons and ethical values fit with other motives and 
desires, how far they express those other motives, and how far they are in 
conflict with them (Altham and Harrison 1995, 202).
Williams’s examples of a naturalistic moral psychology that does not prefigure 
the end from the beginning are various. They include Hume and Nietzsche, but 
also writers such as Thucydides, Diderot, Stendhal, and the ancient tragedians, 
who have a ‘powerful understanding of human motivation, in particular of rela-
tions between ethical and non-ethical motivations’ (Altham and Harrison 1995, 
204). But, in this discussion, the first example Williams gives of a modern who 
had such an understanding is Freud, and we can see how this works in Shame and 
Necessity, in two ways.
The book involves a contrast between modern guilt and shame, and an under-
lying contrast between the ancient Greek and the modern standpoint. It is not 
so much a question of Greek shame versus modern guilt as of how the Greek 
approach declined to separate the two (Williams 1993, 91). The modern approach 
does separate them, creating an account of guilt that is narrow and voluntaristic. 
Shame’s quality is that it is more contextual than guilt, permitting understanding 
of a failing or inadequacy and what it means in an actor’s, and in other people’s, 
lives. Modern guilt follows the ‘peculiar’ moral approach, simply affirming one 
has done wrong, without a broader understanding. ‘Shame can understand guilt’, 
says Williams, ‘but guilt cannot understand itself’ (Williams 1993, 93). At this 
point, Williams draws upon ‘psychological materials’ (ibid), what we can call 
‘naturalistic elements’ for a moral psychology, to illuminate shame and help also 
with guilt. Here, we can identify psychoanalytic ideas in Williams’s argument, 
though Freud’s name goes unmentioned:
Even if shame and its motivations always involve … the gaze of another, 
… for many of its operations the imagined gaze of an imagined other 
will do…. What I have called the internalised other … is conceived as 
one whose reactions I would respect…. The internalised other is indeed 
abstracted and generalised and idealised, but he is potentially somebody 
rather than nobody, and somebody other than me. He can provide the focus 
of real social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in one way rather than 
another…. The world … is represented … by an internalised other… (Wil-
liams 1993, 82–85, emphasis added).
This idea of an imagined or internalised other that is in-me-and-not-me involves 
intrapsychic identification with another. It is taken from psychoanalysis, where, 
to quote Freud, it ‘is known … as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with 
another person’, one that ‘endeavours to mould a person’s own ego after the fash-
ion of the one that has been taken as a model’ (Freud 1985, 134–135). In Shame 
and Necessity, Williams develops a moral psychology to explain the ethical qual-
ity of shame as it emerges from encounters central to psychic development.
1 3
Criminal Law and Philosophy 
That is his first encounter with moral psychology, but there is a second, in an 
addendum entitled ‘Mechanisms of Shame and Guilt’, a four page endnote that was 
not integrated into the book. Here, Williams proposes a moral psychology of guilt 
alongside that of shame, complete with its own particular internalised figure, that of 
a ‘victim or an enforcer’. In line with the protocols of moral psychology, this cannot 
simply be stipulated or derived as a necessary moral form, but must be traced back 
to the conditions of psychic development understood in a naturalistic manner:
In the case of guilt, this condition can be met by supposing that, at the most 
primitive level, the attitude of the internalised figure is anger, while the 
reaction of the subject is fear…. From this primitive basis, it is possible, by 
what is sometimes called ‘bootstrapping’, to develop the model to allow for 
reactions that are progressively more structured by social, ethical, or moral 
notions. So mere fear at mere anger becomes fear of recrimination… (Wil-
liams 1993, 219).
As we shall see, the strong echo here is to Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents 
(Freud 1985), where fear of and anger at the father or another authority figure rep-
resents the basis of guilt. But Williams was only sketching possible links in these 
four pages, indicating the bridgehead to moral psychology rather than developing it 
systematically. It is also important to note that he was drawn to psychoanalytic ideas 
without having a settled view as to what they were. In the passage I have just quoted, 
guilt is a fearful or angry result of identification with a victim or enforcer, which 
evolves into ethically elaborated notions. Elsewhere, however, Williams wrote of the 
psychoanalytic grounds of moral psychology in different terms: 
As soon as we look at blame not as a uniquely appropriate expression of 
truly moral judgement, and not, on the other hand, simply as an instrument 
of social control, but see it as part of a concrete ethical life, we shall be 
helped to understand the other psychological forces (such as love, perhaps) 
that are needed to make blame possible as a manifestation of the ethical dis-
positions (Williams 1995, 16, emphasis added).
The passage comes out of the blue in an essay on free will, but significant here is 
the emphasis not on fear and anger, but on love, a very different basis for feelings 
of guilt, though one that is developed in the psychoanalytic literature. We will 
pursue the difference between these two approaches below. This is, then, what 
we get from Williams: bridgeheads to the political critique of modern morality 
as socially functional but intellectually shallow and ‘peculiar’, and to the idea of 
a moral psychology that would underpin ethical experience, and that would be 
truthful to what it means to be human in a way that the modern ‘peculiar’ insti-
tution, with its moralised psychology, cannot be. As for what the nature of the 
moral psychology of guilt should be, however, this is only a start.
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2  Guilt, Atonement and Identification: Ethical Elements for a Moral 
Psychology
Because they have defined themselves in a manner that reveals identification 
with others, the actions of those others are granted power over them…. Indi-
viduals may in these circumstances believe themselves guilty (Morris 1987, 
240).
Morris published a book of essays called On Guilt and Innocence in 1976, and he 
followed this with an essay called ‘Nonmoral Guilt’ in 1987. From the former, we 
get the idea of atonement; in the latter, Morris develops the idea of identification. 
The two ideas can be seen to be closely linked in the understanding of guilt, and 
Morris also illuminates the difference between legal guilt and a broader metaphysi-
cal form that reflects Williams’s concern with modern guilt’s narrow abstraction and 
‘peculiarity’. In this section, we consider Morris’s view of atonement and identifica-
tion seriatim.
2.1  Guilt and Atonement
Morris’s (1976) book is subtitled ‘Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychol-
ogy’, so that his use of the term ‘moral psychology’ predates Williams’s.4 In the 
preface, Morris notes that philosophers have written exhaustively on punishment 
and responsibility, but their focus is limited to questions of the justification of pun-
ishment and the ascription of responsibility. Little attention has been paid to ‘con-
cepts of guilt and guilt feelings, and … to the rich assortment of related concepts 
such as remorse, repentance, contrition, forgiveness and shame’ (Morris 1976, viii). 
The ‘complex world of moral feelings, a world so central to our lives, so deep in sig-
nificance for us, so vividly and thoroughly displayed in literature’ has attracted little 
attention from philosophers.5 Morris added that a ‘better grasp of guilt and related 
concepts will mean a more informed judgment of the merits of our common moral 
and legal practices’ (ibid). The division implicit in the subtitle between legal phi-
losophy and moral psychology suggests closeness to Williams’s distinction between 
naturalistic moral psychology and morality as a ‘peculiar’ institution, and there is 
much in Morris’s account to support convergence. In one short essay on ‘Guilt and 
Shame’, Morris writes that, in contrast to shame, guilt ‘finds a natural role within the 
law’ (Morris 1976, 63), and this because law maintains ‘a certain balanced distribu-
tion of freedom … by ordering relationships among individuals through rules that 
set up a system of reciprocal rights and duties’ (ibid). Though he does not mention 
the term, this is Williams’s realm of ‘the voluntary’, the space of a moralised psy-
chology under the rubric of legal form, which he contrasts with the idea of shame.
4 In Shame and Necessity (1993, 198, note 35), Williams acknowledges the significance of Morris’s 
work.
5 Murphy (2012) touches on issues in moral psychology especially where he engages with Morris’s 
work.
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In this essay, however, Morris accepts the nature and the form of law as the 
home of modern guilt. Yet, in the next essay, ‘Guilt and Suffering’, he takes guilt 
in a different and contrasting direction. Here, the account of guilt is both more 
personal and more metaphysical, and it is at odds with how he described it in the 
previous essay. Here, guilt is not legal guilt, but is instead psychic and somatic: it 
means feeling bad, ‘rotten, depleted of energy, tense’ (Morris 1976, 99), for ethi-
cal reasons. The core idea is of real emotional pain that comes from separating 
oneself off by an act of violation from union with a valued other. Such union, best 
exemplified in love, provides a feeling of wholeness or completeness, while guilt 
relates to a wholeness that is broken and undone:
In seeing oneself as cut off from others one feels a sense of incompleteness, 
as a lover who loses a loved one may feel that a part of him has been taken 
away or torn from him. The person feels that peculiar pain and uneasiness 
when feeling guilty of cutting off a part of himself…. In cutting oneself off 
from others one comes to see oneself as being cut off, not whole, as if one 
had destroyed what one loved and thus also destroyed a part of oneself. This 
image of cutting off and being cut off, not whole, finds support in our view 
of the guilty person as not being able to function as a whole person could 
and does, not being able to enjoy life fully… (Morris 1976, 99–100).
Guilt weighs on a person who has brought such feelings on himself. The emo-
tional pain of the broken self presses for ways to restore wholeness, to return to 
being at one with oneself and others:
To feel relieved of guilt is to feel again that one is joined together with oth-
ers and with oneself, to no longer be divided within and at war with our-
selves and others. This need to make amends, to mend what has been dam-
aged, and to be at one again with others and oneself is at the core of guilt. 
If it is successful, it is atonement, being at one with (Morris 1976, 100, 
emphasis added).
To atone is to return one’s guilty self to a state of wholeness, to restore the lost 
connections, to be back to being ‘at one’. This is the original meaning of atone-
ment and it involves for Morris moral, emotional, psychic and somatic pain both 
in coming to acknowledge one’s wrongdoing, and also then in seeking to address 
it. It is the pain of self-anger and shame at what one has done; it is a consequence 
of acknowledging to oneself that one was in the wrong; and it is what makes 
genuine confession or contrition so hard, just as the release they eventually bring 
is genuinely felt as a weight lifted.
As I have stressed, Morris suggests a link between the psychic and the somatic. 
Moral contrition is a matter of pain, manifested as feeling rotten, depleted of 
energy and tense. Emotional pain is felt as embodied, pointing to the kind of con-
nection that a Williams-style moral psychology would expect to find as it builds 
up from psychic states that are rooted in physiological conditions. This thinking 
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is very much in line with psychoanalysis.6 Important too is the line that Morris 
draws between this account of guilt and guilt in law. The pain ‘we suffer when 
feeling guilty and the pain involved in the expression of those feelings differs 
from pain that is inflicted with the significance for us of punishment’ (Morris 
1976, 104). The essence of legal punishment lies in a deprivation with a mean-
ing that is communicated to the person who is to be punished. It is deliberately 
inflicted pain for wrongdoing, but it is not restorative of a sense of individual 
wholeness. It may be viewed as restoring a ‘certain disrupted rule-established 
equilibrium of benefits and burdens’, but this value of completeness in ‘imper-
sonal, reciprocal legal situations’ (ibid) is very different from the wholeness that 
the moral psychology of guilt seeks. In this latter setting, the value of punishment 
to the requital of guilt is ‘non-existent, insignificant, or positively perverse’, for 
here we consider guilt and atonement in a context akin to ‘where a friendship or 
love relationship based on affection, respect, and trust has been damaged’ (Mor-
ris 1976, 105). The point is that ethical guilt of this sort and the restoration of 
wholeness is at odds with the functioning of an inculpatory legal process leading 
to punishment:
While punishment might be seen as restoring a rule-established equilibrium of 
benefits and burdens by taking from the wrongdoer benefits not permitted him, 
it is never by itself restorative of relationships that are defined by feelings and 
commitments. Something must come in these relationships from the injured 
party if ever there is to be restoration—forgiveness. But something of course 
must also come from the guilty party, [in terms of] restorative responses (Mor-
ris 1976, 105–106).
Now we are quite clearly in the territory sketched by Williams of a naturalistic 
moral psychology that would grasp the ethical feelings that guilt invokes. The value 
of Morris’s account is his linking of the ethics of guilt taken at a metaphysical level 
to the moral feelings of a person and a body. Note also that, comparing the two, 
Morris’s psychological route is from love rather than anger. In this way, he not only 
distinguishes guilt in a moral-legal sense (Williams’s ‘peculiar’ institution) from 
a deeper ethical guilt (in line with moral psychology), he develops the latter sub-
stantively in ways that link moral experience to emotional feeling. He additionally 
brings the psychic and the somatic together around the idea of love, and finds guilt 
and reparation at this level, and in contrast to the logic of guilt in the law.
2.2  ‘Nonmoral’ Guilt and Identification
Morris’s account may, however, invite a question. He notes the desire to restore 
wholeness that lies at the root of guilt and he links this to an account of love [‘as a 
lover who loses a loved one may feel that a part of him has been taken away or torn 
6 Consider here Jonathan Lear’s wonderful summary of Freud as setting out to solve ‘the mystery of the 
flesh made word’ (Lear 1990, xii).
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from him …, as if one had destroyed what one loved and thus also destroyed a part 
of oneself’ (Morris 1976, 99)]. But a person who for example violates a stranger 
may feel guilty for what he has done, and while one may talk of loving a stranger, 
this may be thought to stretch the analogy. One may wish for more ‘psychological 
material’ to explain how the moral psychology works with regard to guilt in relation 
to strangers. This brings us to Morris’s account of identification in his 1987 essay. 
This has the intriguing, somewhat question-begging, title ‘Nonmoral guilt’, which 
indeed emphasises precisely Williams’s point that there is a particular contrasting 
way of speaking about guilt in law, which is termed ‘moral guilt’.7 This is none other 
than Williams’s ‘peculiar’ guilt, based on voluntary control of agency, and which 
contrasts with the broader sense of guilt Morris calls ‘nonmoral’.8 Such a broader 
sense Morris developed in the 1976 book; in the 1987 essay, he draws on it to cover 
situations where a person may feel guilt at a distance without having acted in a 
legally culpable way. Nonmoral guilt occurs, for example, where someone has been 
the unwitting beneficiary of bad outcomes for others, or complicit in a distanced 
and non-active way with a bad action, for example, committed by one’s country or 
historically, by one’s parents’ generation. Morris considers such feelings of guilt for 
matters distant from one’s acts to be morally appropriate.
Why should one feel guilt when one has not acted? Nonmoral guilt, guilt that is 
not based on moral culpability because in control of one’s voluntary actions, exists 
because nonetheless one identifies with another, and this is the psychological mech-
anism that links feelings of guilt with a sense of love or wholeness with others. This 
cannot be called ‘moral guilt’, if we accept that moral guilt involves the voluntary 
control of an action, yet it is an ethical guilt, which Morris uncomfortably describes 
as nonmoral:
Feeling guilty, then, would both mark one’s attachment to principles of fair-
ness and justice and manifest one’s solidarity with others. While nonmoral, 
it would derive from a moral posture toward others. One’s feelings would 
track the scope of one’s identificatory ties with the less fortunate, those before 
whom one feels guilty… (Morris 1987, 237).
The key idea here is not that of a simple sympathy with the other, imagining her 
experience, but rather involves the deeper intrapsychic reality of entering into the 
experience of the other with whom one identifies:
An identification with others, then, may be operative that is not limited to 
particular aims or dispositions that have led to evil…. One’s identification 
with another implies, for example, that we suffer when they do, just as we are 
pleased when they are. We imagine their feelings, thereby ‘entering into’ them. 
We have the feelings we imagine them to be having as contrasted with our 
7 Murphy (2012, 98) calls Morris’s choice of terminology ‘unfortunate’ for allowing a Kantian ethic 
of voluntary wrongdoing ‘to gobble up the entire domain of morality’. Unfortunate, but also perhaps 
affirmative of Williams’s political critique of modern morality.
8 Morris explains ‘moral guilt’ as the limited idea of culpable responsibility for wrongdoing, involving 
‘the intentional transgression of prohibition … by a definite voluntary act’ (Morris 1987, 220).
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merely responding in an appropriate way, say with sympathy, to the feelings 
we imagine them to be having… (Morris 1987, 239).
This entering into the mind and experience of the other does not mean we become 
the other. We retain ‘our own identity at the same time as we identify with’ (ibid) 
that person. This is Williams’s imagined or internalised other who is in-me-and-not-
me, but whereas Williams deployed the idea to think of the voice that speaks or the 
observer who sees, Morris uses it to explain why a person might feel for or iden-
tify with the violation, victimisation or suffering of another, and therefore might feel 
guilt for her violation. Where another, for example, a parent, has been a perpetrator,
[i]dentification would have us imagine what our own reactions would be were 
we the wrongdoer…. [T]he process of identification, once operative, carries 
a psychological momentum so that, in identifying with the person engaged 
in wrongdoing, one imagines how one would oneself feel…. [These] feelings 
connected with identificatory processes are often perfectly normal, and it is 
their total absence that may occasion concern…. Because they have defined 
themselves in a manner that reveals identification with others, the actions of 
those others are granted a power over them…. Individuals may in these cir-
cumstances believe themselves guilty (Morris 1987, 239–240).
When one identifies with another in Morris’s account, one moves from a sense of 
wholeness and solidarity with another, and on that basis one ‘enters into’ another; 
and the entering into another is also the taking of the other into oneself.9 The move 
of identification is both inward-outward and outward-inward, and this is because the 
initial idea is of the self that is linked to the other by love, wholeness or solidarity. In 
this way, Morris combines his earlier account of guilt as the fracturing of wholeness 
leading to atonement (‘at-one-ment’) (Morris 1976, 100) with an understanding of 
the mechanism by which the fracturing is experienced (identification). In the pro-
cess, he brings us close to the ‘psychological materials’ we need to think about guilt. 
What would now be needed would be a development of those materials at a deeper 
level, and this beckons us to the realm of psychoanalysis and Freud, where Williams 
has already invited us to go.
3  Metapsychology as Philosophical Enquiry
Psychoanalysis is the flourishing human activity of the rational soul taking 
immediate, poetic, and practical responsibility for the nonrational soul. Other 
names for this activity are … truthfulness, rationality, freedom and eudaimo-
nia (Lear 2017, 47).
But why should we accept Williams’s invitation? One reason would be that his and 
Morris’s accounts have taken us to the edge between philosophy and psychoanalysis. 
9 Identification on Morris’s examples can be with both a perpetrator and her guilt, and with a victim 
and her violation. The general question is why one might feel guilty for acts or situations that involve 
distance from either one’s acts or immediate emotional commitments, if guilt is based on fractured love.
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The spirit of truthful enquiry might push us on, realising that we must shift disci-
plines to see the whole picture, but requiring us to leave the domain of philosophy. 
A second reason that might be more persuasive, for philosophers at least, is provided 
by Lear, who argues that the move into psychoanalysis is a way of developing philo-
sophical enquiry according to philosophical criteria. In accepting Williams’s invita-
tion, we are extending philosophy appropriately, not moving to another field.
3.1  Philosophy at the Brink
From Williams, we have the idea of a ‘peculiar’ morality that dominates modern 
ethical thinking, and which is limited in scope and depth by its yoking to a specific 
institutional framework. Williams’s critique of that institutional morality goes in two 
directions. The first is towards politics and history, the second towards an under-
lying ethical or moral psychology which would ground ethics in human psychol-
ogy and not via the pre-formed dictates of a political institution. Such a psychology 
should attend to the ‘psychological material’ involved in human reactions and rela-
tions, though precisely how ‘the moral’ and ‘the psychological’ should be config-
ured remains unclear.
Nonetheless, Freud by name, and psychoanalysis by nature, play an important 
role in Williams’s rudimentary moral psychology. In Morris, we see a similar out-
come by a different route. Morris has no critique of a ‘peculiar’ institution, but he 
does have a critical understanding of guilt, which he develops by showing the limits 
of voluntariness as the base category in blame and guilt theory. Calling this ‘moral 
guilt’, he develops a second ‘nonmoral’ form, which emphasises the breaking apart 
of the self, the search for wholeness through atonement, the basis of wholeness in 
love for the self and the other, and the importance of identification with the other as 
guilt’s source. The only complaint one could have about Morris is that he calls this a 
‘nonmoral’ theory, for plainly it is not; yet the terminology makes Williams’s point 
that theory remains in thrall to a superficial concept, that of the voluntary. Identi-
fication is the key to nonmoral guilt, and it is also a key element in psychoanalytic 
theory, so Morris has introduced a concept that indicates a provenance that Williams 
would have us explore. That both Morris and Williams refer to the basic psycho-
logical mechanism of an intrapsychic dialogue with another that is a part of the self 
but takes the form of another’s voice indicates their joint direction of travel towards 
psychoanalysis.
3.2  From Metaphilosophy to Metapsychology
If we connect psychology and ethics around guilt, is it a question of a non-phil-
osophical add-on or can the psychoanalytical element become a part of a fuller, 
more rounded, philosophy? Lear is remarkable as a philosopher with a profound 
understanding of Greek philosophy (e.g., Lear 1988), and as a psychoanalyst who 
has developed an original interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis (Lear 1990), 
which he links to Greek philosophy (Lear 1998, 2015, 2017). Drawing on the 
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psychoanalytic work of Loewald (1980),10 Lear develops an account of Freud that 
emphasises the importance of his later structural theory of mind, and the importance 
within it of an understanding of how the force known severally as love, Eros, the life 
drive, or libido evolves as it is ‘enformed’ through relations with others. Here, iden-
tification plays a central role, and from this work, we can see how an expansion of 
philosophy to include ‘psychological materials’ becomes philosophically possible.
Here, Lear’s distinctive approach is to align an interpretation of Freud with Aris-
totle. He seeks to engage the ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational’ sides of the psyche, in 
order to follow the Socratic injunction to know, and to be true to, oneself as the basis 
for a flourishing, eudaimonic, life (Lear 2015, ch. 1). Lear views Freud as implic-
itly at least pursuing an essentially philosophical, and within that, specifically Greek 
project. In the first book of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle raises the philosophi-
cal question of the relationship between the rational and the non-rational parts of 
the psyche (Aristotle 1984, 1741). However, Aristotle possessed a weak analysis of 
that relationship, which psychoanalysis is able to develop with its own account of 
the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious mind. Psychoanalysis is 
thus a modern discipline rooted in an ancient philosophical quest:
Philosophy has long considered human life to be distinctive (and valuable) 
in virtue of its capacity for self-conscious awareness…. From the time of 
Plato and Aristotle … one of reason’s central tasks has been taken to be the 
thoughtful, self-conscious integration of the human psyche. The point is not 
merely that psychoanalysis provides insight into how such integration might 
be achieved—far beyond anything Plato or Aristotle imagined—it is that psy-
choanalytic activity itself is the very exercise of self-conscious, thoughtful 
integration of the psyche…. Psychoanalysis gives us unparalleled access to the 
microcosm of reason’s working at the interface of (what Aristotle called) the 
rational and non-rational parts of the soul (Lear 2015, 212).
Psychoanalysis is no more nor less than the modern continuance of the ancient quest 
for the rational achievement of happiness. Viewed from this point of view, the rela-
tionship between reason and the non-rational11 is specific. It involves more than 
reflection upon, control over, or judgment of the passions, emotions and inclina-
tions. The move is not one of Kantian withdrawal in order to critically reflect on nat-
ural impulses12; nor is it a question, as it is in Aristotle’s practical ethics, of refine-
ment of and training in virtuous practices; rather it involves acknowledgement of, 
10 On Loewald, see Mitchell and Black (1995, 186–193), and Mitchell (1998).
11 In Freudian terms, this becomes the engagement between the conscious mind and the unconscious 
mind.
12 Murphy (2012, 239) takes up the Kantian line when he writes: ‘Freud and other psychoanalysts talk 
brilliantly about the infantile origins of our loves, but surely one of our missions—as autonomous and 
rational human beings—is to attempt to transcend the limitations imposed by those origins, not to sur-
render to them.’ Between transcendence and surrender, there is living and knowing engagement with that 
which remains a part of us. How could, and why would, Murphy (2012, 107–113) reflect movingly on 
the ongoing quality of his own bad conscience, on shame and ego ideals, had he truly transcended his 
childish origins, and should he attempt so to do?
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and reasonable engagement with, a part of the psyche that has its own reasons. The 
aim is for the rational and non-rational sides of the human psyche to be construc-
tively engaged in a way that permits a person to act with a degree of unity of the 
self, hence to be true to the self. This permits one to be self-reflective in action, and, 
on that basis, to be in the best position to flourish as a person. Freud ‘simply’, one 
might say, helps us pursue Socrates’s injunction that we should before all else know 
ourselves, so that the key value in psychoanalysis is truthfulness about the self, both 
in terms of what we know of the self, and how we act. We learn about ourselves, 
about the interconnection of and engagement between our rational and non-rational 
parts, in order to be true to who we are, to follow the Greek commitment to a unified 
psyche, and to achieve a stronger, more completely free, because integrated, agency:
In this way, psychoanalysis can be seen as an attempt to resume the ancient 
project of an ethics and politics grounded in and explained by a robust concep-
tion of human flourishing. This is the project the ancient Greek philosophers 
could not themselves complete (Lear 2015, 17).
Other names for psychoanalytic activity are ‘truthfulness, rationality, freedom and 
eudaimonia’ (Lear 2017, 47). The claim to truthfulness picks up Williams’s aspira-
tion for a ‘truthful ethical life’, which, he says, has always been ‘one that can include 
our best understanding of our psychological life’ understood naturalistically (Wil-
liams 1995, 19–20). The question then would be: how does this relate to the under-
standing of guilt as we have developed it above, in terms of atonement and iden-
tification? In delving into the psychoanalytic understanding of guilt, I believe we 
can hope to deepen our grasp on how guilt functions as a human response, and that 
would be a philosophical enquiry, under the Socratic injunction to know ourselves, 
in order to act with greater self-awareness and therefore freedom.
4  Guilt, Pleasure and Happiness
[On] a familiar reading of Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, the world 
is not a place that is conducive to human happiness. And … the aim of civili-
zation … is to keep us in line…. This reception has become boilerplate; one of 
the joys of Loewald’s writings is that he offers a different choice of inheritance 
(Lear 2017, 193).
From Williams and Morris, we have the idea that the intrapsychic reality of the 
guilty person involves a relationship with another. This could be the angry internal 
voice that makes us feel bad (the victim, the enforcer) (Williams), or it could be 
the feeling of entering into another in order to identify with her pain, which then 
becomes our pain (Morris). Though they have similar kinds of expression as painful 
feeling, these are not the same forms of interiority. Williams’s internal other is angry 
and guilt comes from fear of that anger, but it will be recalled that elsewhere, Wil-
liams thought that love might be at the heart of the psychological reaction that leads 
to guilt. Love is much more the key to Morris’s account. The person identifies with 
the other by seeing herself as, putting herself in, that other, and feeling either as she 
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might feel (as a victim), or according to what she has done (as a perpetrator). Iden-
tificatory guilt is feeling emotional or somatic pain, and pain is related to the breach 
in wholeness that is a loss of emotional unity in oneself and with others. Identifica-
tory guilt is about the loss of wholeness that comes from love of self in relation to 
the other, and it results in psychic and somatic pain.
In this section, I consider how these two conflicting routes to guilt (anger/fear and 
love) reflect discussion around identification in psychoanalysis itself. I begin with 
Freud’s predominantly anger-based approach in Civilization and Its Discontents but 
note a conflicting love-based approach.13 Underlying the difference is an unresolved 
conflict between understanding the psyche in terms of pleasure and happiness.
4.1  Guilt in Civilization and Its Discontents: Repression, Anger, Fear
The difference between love and a combination of anger and fear as the ground of 
guilt is important because it reveals two roads down which a psychoanalytic under-
standing of guilt might travel. In Freud’s own thinking, it would appear that it is 
fear and anger that lie at the heart of guilt, but we shall see that this is not neces-
sarily the case. Nonetheless, if we consider Freud’s account where he most clearly 
set it out, in Civilization and Its Discontents, it is guilt as resulting from aggres-
sion, fear, and anger that is at the centre. In the following two passages, for example, 
Freud identifies two sources of guilt. One involves fear at the angry response of an 
authority figure, the other involves an angry resentment at having to suppress one’s 
desires, which gets turned back onto oneself (introjected) as the development of a 
harsh super-ego:
Thus we know of two origins of the sense of guilt: one arising from fear of 
an authority, and the other, later on, arising from fear of the super-ego. The 
first insists upon a renunciation of instinctual satisfactions; the second, as well 
as doing this, presses for punishment, since the continuance of the forbidden 
wishes cannot be concealed from the super-ego. We have also learned how the 
severity of the super-ego—the demands of conscience—is to be understood. 
It is simply a continuation of the severity of the external authority, to which it 
has succeeded and which it has in part replaced (Freud 1985, 319).
13 Any serious account of Freud on guilt will have to reflect the conflicts in his account. Deigh (1996) 
takes his analysis from what Freud says in Civilization and Its Discontents, and then acknowledges that 
the account there is hard to square with Freud’s general position. Accordingly, he finds a ‘Nietzschean’ 
account of super-ego formation and thence guilt in Civilization, which compares with the ‘standard’ 
account elsewhere. The difference concerns the role of the Oedipus complex in creating the super-ego, 
which is unimportant in Civilization but central elsewhere. (It appears once, in discussing the story of 
the band of brothers who kill their father, but not in relation to the super-ego.) As we shall see, it is 
central to Hans Loewald’s account, in a more extended, less sex/gender focused, version than Deigh 
describes. Deigh is not wrong to find a different account in Civilization than elsewhere; where we dif-
fer is with regard to how that difference is to be explained. From my point of view, the underlying con-
flict is between the earlier stimulus satisfaction, pleasure-based, account, and the later structural theory, 
grounded in love and ego formation. Deigh notes the difference between earlier and later Freud, but does 
not build on it. In my view, the ‘Nietzschean’ account Deigh describes is descriptively valid, but leaves 
Freud in a cul de sac with regard to a plausible ethics of guilt, as Murphy (2012, 96–97) suggests.
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In this rather bleak analysis, human beings are forced by nature to repress their 
instincts in order that society might be possible. Civilization is a necessary but an 
uncomfortable place to be. Aggressiveness is at the core of human agency, but it 
becomes internalised through the super-ego, ‘which now, in the form of “con-
science”, is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness 
that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals’, and this 
is the basis of ‘the sense of guilt; it expresses itself as a need for punishment’ (Freud 
1985, 315–316). In this setting, the individual achieves a sense of guilt by identifica-
tion with the anger of authority figures, which he internalises:
A considerable amount of aggressiveness must be developed in the child 
against the authority which prevents him from having his first, but none the 
less his most important, satisfactions …; but he is obliged to renounce the sat-
isfaction of this revengeful aggressiveness. He finds his way out of this eco-
nomically difficult situation with the help of familiar mechanisms. By means of 
identification he takes the un-attackable authority into himself. The authority 
now turns into his super-ego and enters into possession of all the aggressive-
ness which a child would have liked to exercise against it… (Freud 1985, 322, 
emphasis added).
Where Freud speaks of guilt through identification, one can see how it links with 
Williams’s comments about fear and anger, but it is nothing like the identifica-
tory connection described by Morris. For Morris, identification is related to love 
and wholeness, not fear, aggression and resentment at authority. The identificatory 
impulse in Morris seeks to find wholeness again, working through the pain that a 
breach of unity between self and other has brought. For him, anger at self may ensue, 
but it is not based on introjected fear or resentment. So, on the face of it, Freudian 
psychoanalysis is unlikely to provide the route to an understanding of the psychol-
ogy of guilt that can take us to Morris, or to Williams when he talks of love, though 
it could ground an understanding of the angry voice of the victim or the enforcer 
that was Williams’s other suggestion for the source of guilt. Identification can thus 
be linked either with love and wholeness or with fear and anger, but in Freud, it is 
the latter connection that is to the fore.
4.2  A Secondary Route to Guilt: Love and Identification
There is, however, a secondary route to guilt in Civilization and Its Discontents, 
which does involve love and loving identification. We may approach this through the 
interpretation of Freud developed by Lear and Loewald, whose accounts centre on 
love, a theme that is explicit, but unevenly developed, in Freud (Loewald 1980; Lear 
1990, 1998, ch. 6).
In his Freud (2015), Lear suggests that there was a reason Freud was unable to 
develop fully the ancient Greek agenda implicit in his work described above. This 
was because he adopted, and failed to distinguish, two contradictory approaches to 
metapsychology, one resting on the significance of pleasure, the other on the impor-
tance of happiness (Lear 2015, 197–199). The latter takes Freud towards Aristotle, 
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but the former remained dominant in his work. The importance of pleasure rested 
upon a modern ‘scientific’ understanding of human behaviour, which emphasised 
the importance of instinctual, including sexual and aggressive, impulses which 
sought satisfaction, and which had to be repressed or sublimated if civilization was 
to be possible. This was a mechanistic, scientistic, nineteenth century model of 
human behaviour, emphasising the pursuit of pleasure, understood as the satisfaction 
of impulses, desires and instincts. It was quite distinct from a model that would find 
itself linked to the kind of Aristotelian approach identified by Lear, one in which 
love and eudaimonic happiness, based upon the engagement of the rational and the 
non-rational sides of the psyche, are to the fore. It is the pleasure-based approach 
that underpins the account of guilt as rooted in fear and anger that we find in Freud.
But the approach that could develop the Greek account of happiness is also pre-
sent in Freud’s thinking, developed in his later structural account of how the ego 
and the super-ego emerge from the earliest, protean, period in a child’s life, where 
an undifferentiated love begins the human journey as libido, a basic, unformed, life 
drive. Freud named this early phase of human life ‘primary narcissism’, but the term 
does not have its modern reference to an overdeveloped self-regard.14 The basic 
argument is from The Ego and the Id (Freud 1984), in which the ego and the super-
ego represent important differentiations in the evolving structure of the mind. These 
enable the person to develop as an autonomous, self- and other-loving being. Key 
to this development is the ‘enforming’ of the initially formless libido as both an 
ego and then, within the ego, a further differentiation that is the super-ego. This 
is a process wherein the child identifies with parental figures in order to take them 
in as ‘ego-ideals’, and to refashion them as building blocks in the child’s own self-
identity. In this structural theory of the mind, loving identification with parental and 
other figures permits the child to grow as an autonomous being in its own right. 
This is the point of the quotation used in Sect. 1.3, that identification is the ‘earliest 
expression of an emotional tie with another person’, moulding ‘a person’s own ego 
after the fashion of the one that has been taken as a model’ (Freud 1985, 134–135).
Now, turning back to the question of guilt, there are indications of the impor-
tance of this ‘happiness-based’ line of thought in Civilization and Its Discontents 
alongside the pleasure-based themes that we have described above. The first section 
of the work is indeed given over to an account of the development of the ego out 
of a field of inchoate love. In the following passage, for example, the ego is formed 
out of basic connections between an infant and a parent in which the infant begins 
with a basic life force or libido, an inchoate and primal love for life, the phase of 
primary narcissism. Loving interaction with parental figures creates a gap between 
what becomes (through ego formation) an infant’s own internality and what (as a 
result) becomes external to it:
An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from the external 
world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him. He gradually learns 
to do so, in response to various promptings.… In this way there is for the first 
14 A point noted by Murphy (2012, 111, note 27) in the punishment literature.
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time set over against the ego an ‘object’, in the form of something which exists 
‘outside’.… One comes to learn a procedure by which … one can differentiate 
between what is internal—what belongs to the ego—and what is external—
what emanates from the outer world…. In this way, then, the ego detaches 
itself from the external world. Or, to put it more correctly, originally the ego 
includes everything, later it separates off an external world from itself (Freud 
1985, 254–255).
Frustratingly, Freud does not pursue this theme into an understanding of guilt. 
Guilt remains stubbornly linked to aggression, fear and anger in the way we have 
described. There is, however, a point in the text, where he finds himself at a loss, and 
reaches for love as an explanation of guilt. It is the point where Freud revisits the 
story of the ‘band of brothers’ who in the earliest time kill their father. This is the 
‘phylogenetic’ story of early human life, involving an extension of what Freud said 
in Totem and Taboo (Freud 1990) about the origins of humankind. It concerns the 
fact that ‘man’s sense of guilt springs from the Oedipus complex and was acquired 
at the killing of the father by the brothers banded together’ (Freud 1985, 12, 324). 
This story of the origins of guilt is problematic for its speculative and mythic qual-
ity, but it is important for how Freud depicts the relationship between guilt and love. 
In the original relationship, sexual rivalry, aggression and hatred lead the sons to 
kill the father. This leads to a question in terms of Freud’s account of guilt: why 
should the sons feel guilty? If they have deployed murderous aggression towards the 
father, then they have not internalised the prohibition against killing, and nor have 
they introjected their aggression, which would be a further source of guilt feelings. 
The internalisation of guilt has not taken root: why then should the sons feel guilty 
for their father’s murder?
Freud initially negotiates this question by suggesting there is a difference between 
feeling remorse and feeling guilt, but he acknowledges that remorse, like guilt, pre-
supposes the existence of a conscience (ibid).15 In the end, he asks: where does 
remorse come from if neither it nor conscience had been internalised as fear and 
anger before the deed? His response is to turn to love, because, it now turns out, 
guilt might not only be about the internalised control of the harsh super-ego. Rather, 
it ‘was the result of the primordial ambivalence of feeling towards the father. His 
sons hated him, but they loved him, too’ (Freud 1985, 12, 325, emphasis added). 
After their hatred had been satisfied by their aggression, ‘their love came to the fore 
in their remorse for the deed’ (ibid, emphasis added). It was their love that ‘set up 
the super-ego by identification with the father; it gave that agency the father’s power’ 
(ibid). In this alternative explanation of guilt, we see ‘the part played by love in the 
origin of conscience and the fatal inevitability of the sense of guilt’ (ibid). But this is 
a different route to guilt, the route of love, or Eros, rather than fear and aggression. 
15 Deigh (1996) seeks to reconcile a fear and anger-based approach with a love-based one by portraying 
guilt in terms of infraction of an authority’s rule, while remorse is linked to feelings of love. But it is not 
clear that Freud attached such significance to the distinction between guilt and remorse. There is a prob-
lem here, but it is the problem of how to introduce the love-based approach to rescue the phylogenetic 
story, given the overall setting of guilt in Civilization on what Deigh calls ‘Nietzschean’ lines.
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Now Freud builds love into his account of guilt. The sense of guilt now becomes 
‘an expression of the conflict due to ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between 
Eros and the instinct of destruction or death’ (Freud 1985, 12, 325). But where did 
love come from in psychoanalytic terms if it was not presaged in the pleasure-based 
account of the control of the instincts through guilt? If we wish to base our theory 
of guilt on the ‘part played by love’, we must follow Freud’s concession away from 
the pleasure approach and towards what Lear calls ‘happiness’. This will take us into 
a discussion of the psychic structure that links atonement and identification in Mor-
ris’s ethical account with the same terms as used in psychoanalysis, and in which, 
we shall see, the super-ego plays an important part.
5  Guilt, Atonement and Prospective Identification
Guilt then is not a troublesome affect that we might hope to eliminate in some 
fashion, but one of the driving forces in the organisation of the self. The self, 
in its autonomy, is an atonement structure, a structure of reconciliation, and as 
such a supreme achievement (Loewald 1980, 393–394).
The question we must now address is how to link the theory of happiness, love and 
identification that we find in Loewald’s and Lear’s accounts of Freud to the account 
of guilt, love, atonement and identification in Morris. Here, we hit an initial prob-
lem, that what Freud says about guilt in his Civilization and Its Discontents mainly 
takes the road of guilt as a response to fear and anger, where these are introjected, 
to become the internal voice of the authority figure, the angry enforcer. The route 
to Williams’s moral psychology of the victim or the enforcer may be open, but not 
to Morris’s account, unless we find a way of building on the secondary approach to 
love and the problem of guilt in the band of brothers in Civilization and Its Discon-
tents. Here, we should wish to put together Freud’s later, unevenly developed, struc-
tural theory of love and ego formation, converting primary, unformed love into ego 
and super-ego formation, with an account of guilt as based on loving identification 
with another. There is a route to be pursued here, and it is through discussion of the 
nature of the super-ego and its role in fostering guilt. This role may be observed in 
both an anger-based account and in the love-based approach promoted by Lear and 
Loewald. In this section, I begin by outlining the role of the super-ego in the anger-
based approach and then turn to how it may be developed in line with loving identi-
fication, in the work of Loewald.
5.1  Guilt and the Harsh Super‑Ego
The anger- and fear-based approach to guilt that we have already rehearsed owes its 
provenance to the pleasure-based account of the human instincts. Pleasure is about 
instinct satisfaction, and since the instincts are of various kinds and include sex and 
aggression, repression and the sublimation of the instincts loom large in this model. 
Such an approach enlists non-sexual love as a means of converting aggression into 
peaceableness, but that is not at all the same as building emotional reactions on the 
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basis of a primary love and the enformed structures that organise it for ego develop-
ment.16 Human beings in the pleasure view are ill-equipped to coexist and need civi-
lization to control aggression. That is the main story of Civilization and Its Discon-
tents, and it enlists the super-ego as the internal figure that represses and controls. 
Conscience is the introjection of the ‘same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would 
have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals’, and it takes the form of a 
special agency that is an unpleasant super-ego:
The tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego that is subjected to it, 
is called by us the sense of guilt; it expresses itself as a need for punishment. 
Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual’s dangerous desire 
for aggression … by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a 
garrison in a conquered city (Freud 1985, 316–317).
The metaphor that ends this passage is telling, for the super-ego is that garrison, and 
its judgments are not only the external that has been taken inside (recall Williams’s 
account of ‘the enforcer’ here), it is a harsh form of judgment reflecting the aggres-
siveness and the resentment that is felt by the individual against his own repression, 
as well as the society’s anger against him. This makes for a grim image, and it is 
complemented by the following passage, which links this malign force with the phi-
losopher Kant:
The super-ego—the conscience at work in the ego—may then become harsh, 
cruel and inexorable against the ego which is in its charge. Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative is thus the direct heir of the Oedipus complex (Freud 1984, 422).
Why the Oedipus complex should be introduced here, and whether this is a neces-
sary representation of Kant is not the point.17 The point is that, for Freud, following 
through on repression of the instincts in the pleasure-based approach, the charac-
ter of the super-ego is harsh and aggressive towards the ego. But, then, is another 
approach to the super-ego possible within the Freudian canon, one more reflective of 
Aristotle than Kant?
5.2  Guilt and the Benign Super‑Ego18
As we have seen, the alternative approach based on happiness develops the account 
of how the early diffuse feelings of love as the initial emotional state of the human 
17 The Oedipus complex is not, as noted above, discussed by Freud in his account of guilt in Civilization, 
save marginally. It should be noted that this quotation comes from the 1924 essay, ‘The Economic Prob-
lem of Masochism’ (also published in Freud 1984), and not from Civilization. For the view that Kant’s 
account of punishment reflects both human dignity and a harsh sense of judgment, see Norrie (1991, ch. 
3).
16 Down the pleasure and instinct route, sexual love demands satisfaction, while non-sexual love oper-
ates to dilute and sublimate sexual and other aggressive demands. See Freud’s discussion in Civilization 
and Its Discontents: Freud (1985, 274–326).
18 I owe the idea of a contrast between ‘good’ (benign) and ‘bad’ (harsh) super-egos and the guilt they 
generate according to the pleasure and happiness models of psychic development to Carl Auerbach.
 Criminal Law and Philosophy
1 3
being is nurtured by parental and other figures as they share their love with the child. 
Doing so, they produce in it a sense of its own identity as worthy of love, self-loving 
and capable of loving others. For the child, parental figures’ existence as individu-
ated loving selves becomes the first identification by which it ‘takes in’ another in 
order to establish its own individuated being. It forms itself absorbing from others, 
so that a sense of identity and autonomy becomes possible, paradoxically, by reli-
ance on those others who love and care for it. Through this process, an ego is formed 
out of early, inchoate, primary love (narcissism). We saw above how in the first 
chapter of Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud described this process, but he did 
not pursue it in his account of guilt. How to connect the two?
There is an answer to this question in two parts in Loewald’s account of the rela-
tionship between the ego and the super-ego, which draws on, first, what Freud called 
‘ego ideals’, and, second, his (Loewald’s) account of the super-ego as an atone-
ment structure (Loewald 1980, ch. 23). In both situations, the underlying relation-
ship is based upon identification between the ego and the other, as this is mediated 
by the super-ego. But the super-ego has a very different mien than the harshness 
described above. In the happiness or love-based approach, the super-ego provides 
coherence and oversight of ego activity as follows. It emerges as a special agency of 
the ego, coming out of the resolution of the Oedipus complex.19 This is well known 
to involve a child coming to terms with issues of sexual identity associated with its 
parents. More than this, it is an account of how a child gains a more complex and 
coherent sense of its own autonomy. The super-ego’s formation is a sexual phase 
that involves father- and mother-identifications, but it is also the phase in which is 
formed a ‘precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two identifications in some way 
united with each other’, giving rise to a special agency that ‘confronts the other con-
tents of the ego as an ego ideal or super-ego’ (Freud 1984, 373). The super-ego is a 
means of organising the self at a higher level than the ego, by producing a measure 
of overall coherence by means of a supervening element within the ego itself, able 
to organise ego activity.20 The result is that the formation of the super-ego equips the 
individual with both a sense of responsibility and, we shall see, a sense of guilt.
5.3  Responsibility, Guilt and Ego Ideals
For Loewald, the development of a super-ego integrates the broad identifications 
that the child takes in from both parents, but it does so in order to form a sense of 
personal responsibility:
Responsibility to oneself, within the context of authoritative norms con-
sciously and unconsciously accepted or assimilated from parental and societal 
sources, is the essence of superego as internal agency…. It involves appropri-
19 Thus the two accounts of the super-ego, as harsh and as benign, are both linked with the Oedipus 
complex.
20 For this reason, super-ego formation, like the ego formation that precedes it, ‘implies an abandonment 
of sexual aims, a desexualisation’ (Freud 1984, 11, 369). More broadly, the complex can be generalised 
to a deeper level than that of sexual identity or family structure, as a ‘childhood florescence of ambiva-
lence towards the important people in one’s life’ (Lear 2015, 180), regardless of gender or sexual desire.
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ating or owning up to one’s needs and impulses as one’s own, impulses and 
desires we appear to have been born with or that seem to have taken shape in 
interaction with parents during infancy…. [So doing] we begin to develop a 
sense of self-identity [which] means to experience ourselves as agents, not-
withstanding the fact that we were born without our informed consent and did 
not pick our parents (Loewald 1980, 392).
Given responsibility, we are now at the place where internal ego ideals can gener-
ate guilt (c.f. Murphy 2012, 292). The term ‘ego ideal’ was not used consistently by 
Freud, but one thing it referenced was the models of what was admirable in parental 
figures that the child took in as the basis for its own aspirations as to how it should 
behave. Once the super-ego is formed, such ego ideals can become the basis for ten-
sion between what the child aspires to be and what it is, and this can lead to a nega-
tive super-ego reaction in the
form of tension between ego and superego. We have a sense of guilt concern-
ing past or present thoughts, feelings and deeds, but only inasmuch as they 
represent a nonfulfillment of the inner image of ourselves, of the internal ideal 
we have not reached (Loewald 1980, 273–274).
The idea of a tension between the ego and super-ego is, of course, also there in 
Freud’s account of the harsh super-ego in Civilization and Its Discontents. In Loe-
wald, it is not the angry voice of the external authority figure introjected into the 
super-ego, but the internal tension brought about by not behaving as one would like 
to at one’s best.21 This is one aspect of a guilt that a person would feel for doing a 
wrong act—not as external repression absorbed to deal with anger, but as something 
having an ethical ground in loving admiration of the good qualities of parents, as the 
feeling that one has done badly according to parental standards with which one has 
identified and set for oneself.
5.4  The Super‑Ego as Atonement Structure
This does not, however, get to the heart of identificatory guilt in Loewald’s terms. 
The tension between what we should like to be and what we are is one thing, and the 
more or less coherent, benign super-ego is the means for making that measure. More 
than this, the super-ego is for Loewald in its very existence an atonement structure. 
Loewald’s deeper point here is that a sense of guilt is embedded in the very pro-
cess of forming a super-ego, because doing so involves casting off those very people 
whom one has until that point loved and taken in in order to be oneself. This is 
the true aftermath of resolving the Oedipus complex. Creating a super-ego—being 
a self-reliant individual—requires one to do this, but it is also something that one 
cannot help but feel bad about. Take the father in Freud’s phylogenetic story whom 
21 In his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933), Freud observed that his account of the 
super-ego seems ‘to have picked out only the parents’ strictness and severity…, whereas their loving care 
seems not to have been taken over and maintained’ (1933, 62). Perhaps to address this, he now identifies 
three functions of the super-ego: self-observation, conscience and maintaining the ideal models drawn 
from parents, educators and teachers.
 Criminal Law and Philosophy
1 3
the sons both love and hate. Loving and hating the father are perfectly understand-
able in terms of the Oedipal drama, since love reflects identification with him, while 
hate represents the need to break from him. Hostility to the father is part of the quest 
to become oneself, for it reflects the conflict in the child’s ‘quest for emancipation 
and self-responsibility with his desire for identification and becoming one with his 
father’ (Loewald 1980, 391). One loves the father, but out of love for oneself, must 
also resent him—and then feel bad about it.
This is not just a matter of fathers and sons. One can speak more generally of ‘the 
parent’ here, for the same is true of any parental figure, and for the girl as well as the 
boy. The parent is a constitutive part of the child’s psychic being, and the child has 
to make that psychic being its own. That means it must actively suppress the paren-
tal identification and, in so doing, must confront that part of its own being that up to 
that point had been constituted by the parent. The Oedipal struggle is thus to negate 
the parent insofar as the parent has until then been constitutive of the child’s identity. 
The child’s aim is to create a clearer, demarcated, sense of its own selfhood, devel-
oping its interiority and subjectivity by forcing the parent more completely outside, 
at a distance from the emerging self, so that it may be emancipated. The parent has 
to be sidelined, but that necessary act can hurt and disturb:
In an important sense, by evolving our own autonomy, our own superego …, 
we are killing our parents. We are usurping their power, their competence, 
their responsibility for us, and we are abnegating them, rejecting them as libid-
inal objects. In short we destroy them in regard to some of their qualities hith-
erto most vital to us. Parents resist as well as promote such destruction no less 
ambivalently than children carry it out (Loewald 1980, 390).
To ‘kill’ one’s (psychic identification with) parents in order to be oneself is neces-
sary, but it involves rejection at the deepest, most constitutive, psychic level of a 
person’s being. The  happiness of selfhood is thus measured against remorse at the 
manner of its achievement, the death inside of the fused child-parent entity. This is 
the basis of the guilt that accompanies the creation of the super-ego, and links the 
super-ego thereafter to a residual need to atone:
Without the guilty deed of parricide there is no autonomous self … no indi-
vidual self worthy of that name, no advanced internal organisation of psychic 
life, [so that] guilt and atonement are crucial motivational elements of the self 
(Loewald 1980, 393).
That is why, as the quote at the beginning of this section continues, guilt is not ‘a 
troublesome affect’ to be eliminated, but ‘one of the driving forces in the organisa-
tion of the self’. That is why the autonomous, responsible self ‘is an atonement struc-
ture, a structure of reconciliation, and as such a supreme achievement’ (Loewald 1980, 
394). At the core of Freudian psychoanalysis in its later structural phase is the theory 
of identification between parent and child. The growth of personhood occurs through 
the taking in of models drawn from those who offer a loving identification for the 
child. From the earliest world of the unformed libidinous id, the primary narcissistic 
state evolves through the creation of an ego and ego ideals into the more complex 
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self-organisation of the super-ego. The latter is achieved by virtue of a struggle over 
identification for identity, autonomy and emancipation, with the closest loving figures 
who have nurtured the child. This is a battle as the child resets its relationships, estab-
lishing a more coherent and sophisticated self in a way that radically alters intrapsy-
chic and interpsychic relations. To do so is to abandon central arrangements of the 
child’s psychic life up to that point, in exchange for a qualitative enrichment of the 
powers of the self. Eventually a renegotiated relationship with parents will emerge, but 
the struggle leaves its mark. It involves the repudiation of a debt owed, the expunging 
of a love given and taken, leaving the foundational imprint of the bad feeling we call 
guilt, and, from that, an underlying instinct to repair and atone.
5.5  Guilt and the Undone Self
If the Oedipal experience might engrain the psyche with guilt and the need to atone, 
there is a final element I should like to propose. The experience of guilt is not just 
related to how one treated the loved parent, it is also concerned with displacement 
within the child as it sets the parent at a distance. This fundamentally disturbs its own 
sense of self as it has existed to that point. Through identification, the parent had been 
a constitutive part of the child’s evolving ego, so that the Oedipal struggle involves 
both negating the parent-in-the-child and the child’s own parent–child self up to that 
point. This involves at the least disturbance of the existing sense of self in the time 
before it can be reconstituted through resetting parent–child boundaries. This suggests 
both a sense of feeling bad (guilty) about repudiating those one loves, and an internal 
sense of being psychically undone. Displacing the parents leaves the child internally 
stripped out, just as a new, more sophisticated, sense of self comes into being. To feel-
ing bad for the loved other is added the bad feeling that is the turbulence brought about 
by displacement in one’s being.
Talk of the Oedipal drama and of ‘killing’ the parent puts the point of rejection 
and negation dramatically. Of course, there may be times when the child imagines 
it would like to ‘kill’ the parent, and the metaphor makes the point that this is a pro-
found shift in the nature of their relationship. In reality, of course, parricide is a part 
of a psychic, not factual reality (Loewald 1980, 393), and the result is usually not the 
actual death of the parent, but rather the evolution of the parent–child relationship 
to one where there is ‘some sort of balance, equality, or transcending conciliation’, 
albeit one that ‘remains vulnerable’ (Loewald 1980, 395). But the experience of love 
and rejection, of destabilisation and reconfiguration is formative, and it gives a psy-
chological basis for the existence of guilt as the sense of feeling bad about another, 
and of feeling bad (undone) within oneself. Guilt involves both aspects, and in its 
formative aspect, is an existential development.
5.6  Prospective Identification and Stranger Killing
How could this experience of guilt and atonement be relevant beyond the Oedipal 
time? The argument is that this period of struggle of the self leaves the psyche with 
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both the means to measure ego ideals against actual performance (responsibility) 
and an imprint or template in terms of guilt and the need to atone (feeling bad about 
another and within oneself). For Freud, the psychic stages a person passes through 
leave their mark. While we might think the Oedipal stage to be one that once passed 
is in the past, Freud insisted that past psychic experiences leave their mark. Loe-
wald makes the point beautifully, quoting from the lines of Ariel in Shakespeare’s 
The Tempest, with which I prefaced this essay: ‘nothing fades, “but doth suffer a 
sea-change into something rich and strange”’ (Loewald 1980, 394). Guilt as a bitter 
and disturbing moral event is painful, leaving one feeling bad—‘rotten, depleted of 
energy, tense’, as Morris puts it. If such a moral experience can be described, what 
are the psychic mechanisms that make it possible? From the theory of super-ego 
formation, we find an intrinsic sense of guilt emerging from the structural formation 
of the human ego. The desire to atone is written into our psychological being, while 
the connection to ego ideals that have not been followed provides the responsibility 
trigger for guilt to occur. We can be responsible for what has occurred and feel bad 
about it. This Loewaldian line out of Freud provides us with a way of understanding 
what it might mean to feel guilty.
But, of course, people may feel guilty in connection with acts they have done that 
are not related to close others. The question then becomes: how do we get from guilt 
in the resolution of personal identity with parental figures to guilt for the violation 
of another person who may indeed be a stranger? The guilt of parricide stems from 
the fact that one is killing a loved other and part of oneself. This is a very particu-
lar drama in the formation of the coherent and autonomous ego. The question is 
whether it has relevance for thinking not only about the guilt of the metaphoric par-
ricide, but also, for example, for the harm in killing another human being who may 
be a complete stranger. Actual homicides really do happen, and we have to think 
about why the perpetrator might then feel bad. How could that be where the con-
nection between the perpetrator and the victim may involve no prior identificatory 
relationship?
I suggest that the way to think beyond metaphoric parricide to guilt in real ‘stran-
ger homicide’ is in terms of ‘prospective’ or ‘anticipatory’ identification. To kill 
another human being is to put an end to a figure who has been a potential object 
of love and identification. It is to destroy a person who would have been a source 
of identification for others, and who might have been a figure who the perpetrator 
could under other circumstances have ‘taken in’. Identificatory possibilities extend 
broadly, indeed to all members of the human species. Every person is a potential 
source of identification: we are all some mother’s child, some child’s possible par-
ent.22 Every human being is constituted by libidinous object love, identification and 
ego formation; we are all the same. To symbolically kill the Oedipal object of one’s 
identificatory love is to repudiate in psychic reality a part of one’s self. To actually 
22 This is the source of the idea of a metaphysical guilt that extends universally and is picked up by 
world religions (Morris 1987, 240). Though I don’t show it here, I suggest it lies at the root of Karl 
Jaspers’s account of German war guilt as metaphysical (Jaspers 2000), on the importance of which see 
Norrie (2017a, ch. 6).
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kill another is to put an end to a source of identificatory love for others in a real 
sense. Imagined parricide of a love figure is close to home, but its benevolent upshot 
can be a development of a further, more balanced, relationship with the loved fig-
ure who survives. Actual homicide combines a more distant relation with another 
human being with a form of destruction that is real and complete. No one survives 
her own homicide. To kill in this way is to destroy a figure who was capable of iden-
tification, who had the possibility of loving identification of and for another, who in 
relevant psychic ways is just like the killer.
To illustrate the point about guilt at the killing of a stranger, just such a logic is 
to be found in Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, where the author describes 
Raskolnikov’s grief at killing the old woman. In this account, Raskolnikov experi-
ences both the sense of a punishment that comes back to himself through identifica-
tion with the victim, and the way in which his existential being is disturbed. With 
regard to the former, he asks: ‘Did I really kill the old woman? No, it was myself 
I killed!—it was myself I have irrevocably ruined!’ (Dostoyevsky 1997, 334). This 
is identificatory guilt with the old woman to whom emotionally he was a stranger. 
With regard to the latter, he ‘suffered cruelly from this conviction, that everything, 
even memory, even the most elementary prudence, was abandoning him’. He asks: 
‘Can this be the punishment already beginning? Indeed, indeed, it is!’ (Dostoyevsky 
1997, 74). This is his own sense of being undone that partners identificatory guilt. 
These are the two different grounds for bad feeling that can be deduced from the 
account of guilt and super-ego formation around the idea of identification. They may 
exist in the case of the real stranger-killer just as much as in the psychic reality of 
metaphoric parricide. They are underpinned by an anticipatory or prospective iden-
tification. They constitute the basis for a moral grammar of guilt and reconciliation 
that can be identified both philosophically (Norrie 2018a) and in ethical practices of 
seeking and giving forgiveness (Norrie 2018b).
6  Linking the Metapsychology and Metaphysics of Guilt
We began this discussion with Williams and the bridgehead he offered to two cri-
tiques of guilt. The first was the political critique of guilt as a core part of the ‘pecu-
liar’, institutionally fused, form of morality in the modern liberal state. This suggests 
why the modern discourse of guilt is essentially limited. The second was the demand 
for a moral psychology that could deepen moral theory, and help to understand what 
a term such as ‘guilt’ might truly mean once we got beyond its modern appearance 
in the ‘peculiar’ institution. This suggests how the modern discourse of guilt is lim-
ited and may be overcome. We pursued this second line through Morris’s thoughtful 
account of guilt, atonement and identification. Taking these together, we identified 
an account of guilt that went beyond moral guilt in its ‘peculiar’ form, to a deeper 
sense of the relationship between wholeness, love, atonement and identification. In 
Morris, these terms nonetheless lack grounding in moral psychology taken to the 
deepest level, that of Williams’s ‘psychological materials’—though there is oblique 
reference to psychoanalytical mechanisms around the idea of identification in his 
work.
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The claim to take moral psychology to its deepest level raises important questions 
about what we should find there. We noted that Williams was ambivalent between 
anger and love, though it is anger that comes to the fore in his limited sally into 
the ‘psychological material’. This suggests a very different approach to that which 
comes from Morris, for there atonement is related to wholeness and love, and iden-
tification is related to fellowship with another into whose being one enters. Anger 
could not be the first port of call for Morris. The anger the guilty person feels must 
be for a failing in relation to love, wholeness and the other with whom one identi-
fies, not just because of an internalised, redirected anger. Yet, here we confronted a 
possible impasse, in that Freud’s metapsychology of guilt clearly focuses on aggres-
sion, fear and anger, and not on love. We noted, however, that such an approach was 
not inevitable if we pursued Freud’s thought, picking up Lear’s point that there was 
an unreconciled conflict in Freud between the earlier pleasure-based theory and the 
later structural account based on love’s ‘enforming’. The latter leads psychoanalysis 
down the route to happiness, and thereby aligns it with the Aristotelian approach in 
ethics to truth, eudaimonia, self-knowledge and the relationship between the rational 
and the non-rational self. Lear’s remarkable contribution is to show how Freud fol-
lows in this line and produces in his metapsychology a potentially richer answer 
to the ancient questions.23 Williams perhaps sensed this possibility in some of his 
broader statements about Freud and moral psychology, but his ‘psychological mate-
rials’ in Shame and Necessity did not move in such a direction.
Finally, we reached beyond Lear to his mentor in metapsychology, Loewald, 
whose account of responsibility and the super-ego as an atonement structure pro-
vides both an immediate link to Morris’s account, and locates the feeling of guilt in 
formation of the human psyche. Guilt most fundamentally relates to the creation of a 
self organised around ego ideals and a super-ego. It is concerned with how a person 
handles identification with parental figures (the creation of ego ideals), and espe-
cially ambivalence to those one loves and holds onto, and must discard in order to 
be oneself (the creation of the super-ego as an atonement structure). Feeling bad is 
written into the human script, and remains a residual ethical reflex for post-Oedipal 
encounters. Just as parents enter into the developing child’s psyche, and that psy-
che experiences guilt at discarding an identification at its heart, so the post-Oedipal 
child and adult enters into loving relations with others through a variety of relation-
ships. The unity these bring, if broken, triggers a desire to atone embedded in the 
enformed psyche. Such unity may be with those who are strangers to us, so that 
identification for guilt may be anticipatory or prospective, based on universal feel-
ings of solidarity.
This point about strangers links Loewald’s metapsychological argument with 
Morris’s metaphysical one. The unity that comes from ‘entering into’ the life of 
the other qua stranger lies in the experience of prospective identification, by means 
23 Aristotle’s answer to the question of knowledge of the non-rational self is limited (see Lear 2015, 
26–27, notes 14 and 23), and accordingly, since the person cannot properly unify herself, one could think 
this explains why Aristotle’s account of the development of the virtues rests on the importance of educa-
tion and training rather than their reflective adoption by a person.
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of which a broad, even universal, form of identification with other members of the 
human species is possible. We can tie the psychological argument for prospective 
identification together with Morris’s account of (wrongly named) ‘nonmoral’ guilt, 
for he too argues for just such a universal form of guilt:
Now, if we accept the legitimacy of identificatory ties … can we not also find 
it acceptable that individuals establish those identificatory ties with others and 
that they may do this without irrationality? We might not ourselves make such 
commitments; but others reveal through their emotional responses that they 
have. Some even reveal, as much religious thought makes evident, a scope of 
identification that embraces the human race. I do not myself presently see that 
such a position is open to challenge (Morris 1987, 240).
What is needed for an adequate moral psychology is that we can relate Morris’s 
moral intuition to an adequate account of psychic development—ground it in the 
‘psychological material’. There is a route to do this through Freud, Lear and Loe-
wald. Through them, we can see how prospective identification becomes the possi-
ble basis for an ethical guilt and atonement located in human moral psychology: how 
metapsychology grounds metaphysics without reducing the one to the other. In this 
way, we reinvigorate the Aristotelian impulse to consider happiness as eudaimonia 
by interpreting what we might call the ‘rational’ (the moral) and the ‘non-rational’ 
(the nonmoral) sides of guilt. We thereby expand the bounds of ethical philosophy 
as we pursue the ancient philosophical injunction to know ourselves—in modern, 
Freudian, terms as animals who think and love.
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